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21. Motivation
Research attributes significance to the role of national symbols. Judging from David
Throsby (2001), there is a large and growing body of economic literature that seeks to
quantify the value of cultural goods and services, such as national parks, museums,
libraries, botanical gardens, zoos, and theaters (cf. Kinsy, Jr., 2002, Aabo, 2005). From
the economist’s viewpoint such literature generalizes proportions put forward by Baumol
and Bowen (1966) about the arts to other areas of culture. There it is suggested that
private markets fail to produce an optimal quantity of the arts and that failure legitimizes
the  provision of the arts by public means. 
Recognition of the value of a constitution is due to Aristotle, I have seen suggested, see,
e.g., Cordeiro (2008). However, according to Charles A. Beard (1935 [1913]), early
theory argued that constitutions were merely political tools justified in support of the
economic interests of the rich class vis-a-vis the poor class. This argument is consistent
with Marxian philosophy by which the economy is the cause and effect of everything.
Although constitutions have existed for many years, it was not until Hayek (1978) that a
new understanding of constitutions emerged, whereby constitutions were supposed to
provide for individual liberty. And that also meant that to the extent that the rule of law
sometimes hinders individual freedom, constitutions contravene economic freedom and
thwart economic performance.
Douglass North (1990) pumps up Hayek’s volume (depth x breadth x scope) by
providing an analytical framework for clarifying how institutions evolve and how they
induce change. In that scheme constitutions either promote or inhibit incentives that are
essential for economic performance. Recent empirical work on the influence of
constitutions on the economic growth of nations are well-informed by North, at least in
their conclusions. La Porta, et. al. (1998), for example, find that constitutions that are
based on French civil law affect economic growth more positively than those based on
British common law. Ed Glaeser, et. al. (2004) are skeptical of the importance of political
institutions, including constitutions. They find that human capital, good policies under a
dictatorship, and only later improved political institutions foster good economic
performance.
From Persson and Tabellini (2004, 2005) I surmise that constitutions are like national
troops ready when called upon to rally against corruption and other problems that tend to
stifle economic performance. Unfortunately the troops have no mandate to call
themselves up. Morever, whether or not they succeed in their mission depends, and
cannot be decoupled from, the policy governing their call-up. Persson and Tabellini
remind us that a presidential regime has policy implications quite different from a
majoritarian dispensation, for example.
All these studies agree that there is a correlation between economic performance and
legal systems, although there is disagreement about whether there is a causation or what
31Some countries have changed national flags with change of government as when a military takes
over.
direction the causation would take. However, despite their strength, the studies suffer a
common weakness; they all slight the fact that some countries’ constitutions change
frequently, in some cases very frequently, while in other countries formal constitutions
do not even exist.  Jose L. Cordeiro (2008) compares diverse constitutions and articles in
many regions of the world. The comparison observes considerable variation. Some
countries like the Dominican Republic have changed constitutions 32 times. Others like
the UK, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, do not even have codified constitutions. In addition, the
number of original articles in each constitution also differs, with the differences ranging
from as few as zero for New Zealand, for example, to as many as 395 for India. Given
such diversity, is it really appropriate to treat countries the same even among
democracies?
There remains sufficient room for better indicators, and national flags seem appropriate.
Like constitutions flags are important national symbols. They vary across countries, but
not too frequently within countries.1 There is not a Republican or Democratic national
flag in the USA, for instance, although under the same constitution a Democratic
administration is often very different in its policy orientation from a Republican
administration.  Even though the general literature on the national value of flags is huge,
there is very little (I am aware of) about the effects of flags on national well-being. The
objective of this paper is to fill a small part of the existing hole in order to enable simple
comparisons between the effects of constitutions and flags on national well-being.
The paper is exploratory; it supplements Amavilah (2008b). As such it does not claim to
solve any serious problem. However, I hope that in its course it stimulates discussions.
Next below I state the framework, consisting of a simple model upon which basic
estimations rely and a brief description of the data. Then I present and comment on the
results in Section 3, before making a concluding remark in the last section.
2. Framework
2.1 Model
Let us measure well-being by the human development index (HDI), and estimate the
effects of national flags and constitutions on it. Assume N is the economically-active
population of the ith country. Given HDI, define some variable
where H = human capital, is a generalized measure of the knowledge and longevity of N,
and X = gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the material well-being of N.
(1)
4Now suppose X is produced according to a conventional Cobb-Douglass
for A = state of technology, L = labor, and K = physical capital. Further suppose L
evolves at an exogenous rate * equal to the rate of growth of N, i.e.,
Then,
Amavilah (2008a, b, c) argues that H = f(N) rather than H = f(L) so that
Since the Health and Education dimensions of H are already included in HDI on the LHS
of (1), they cannot be included on the RHS. Even so, H is multi-dimensional and the
vector q would include flags and constitutions. Thus, using F for flags and C for
constitutions, (5) becomes
Now the implication of (4) is that
Dividing through (7) by N yields
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
5Table 1 - Dummy values for flags and constitutions across 59 nations, 2007
Country N-growth (n) Capital Flag
 
No.
Constitutions
No. Articles
in
Constitution
1. USA 0.97 19.71 12 01 07
2. Canada 0.90 21.15 09 02 61
3. Australia 1.01 26.25 12 01 128
4. Japan -0.02 23.37 09 02 103
5. N. Zealand 0.90 24.36 12 00 00
6. Austria 0.36 20.62 09 02 152
7. Belgium 0.24 20.91 07 01 198
8. Finland 0.29 20.58 07 02 131
9. France 0.49 20.23 12 16 89
10. Germany -0.07 17.15 12 03 146
11. Greece 0.21 24.34 08 13 120
12. Ireland 1.77 27.10 13 02 50
13. Italy 0.13 20.65 13 01 139
14. Netherlands 0.21 19.34 12 01 142
15. Portugal 0.37 22.45 17 06 296
16. Spain 0.77 29.53 11 08 169
17. Denmark 0.21 20.82 09 01 89
18. Sweden 0.45 17.14 05 02 155
19. Switzerland 0.38 21.52 12 03 197
20. UK 0.42 16.98 12 00 00
21. Cameroon 2.00 19.07 18 05 69
22. Kenya 2.65 16.58 18 01 127
23. Morocco 1.20 25.96 17 04 122
24. S. Africa 0.55 18.19 21 05 243
25. Tunisia 1.08 23.37 09 01 78
26. Bangladesh 1.67 24.43 17 01 153
27. China 0.58 42.61 10 04 138
6Country N-growth (n) Capital Flag
 
No.
Constitutions
No. Articles
in
Constitution
2Dominican Republic
28. India 1.46 30.97 19 01 395
29. Indonesia 1.16 24.61 09 03 37
30. S. Korea 0.33 30.06 13 01 130
31. Malaysia 1.69 19.94 14 01 181
32. Pakistan 1.84 18.08 13 04 280
33. Philippines 1.72 14.60 16 06 306
34. Singapore 1.19 19.03 09 01 163
35. Sri Lanka 0.47 26.53 25 03 172
36. Thailand 0.66 31.61 12 17 299
37. Turkey 1.26 24.77 09 04 177
38. Ukraine -0.76 22.62 10 02 161
39. Egypt 1.76 17.98 14 05 211
40. Israel 1.66 17.71 08 00 00
41. Kuwait 2.44 20.28 20 01 183
42. Libya 1.97 8.94 13 02 37
43. Qatar 2.11 35.48 09 04 121
44. S. Arabia 2.24 17.86 13 00 00
45. Argentina 1.00 21.18 10 06 107
46. Bolivia 1.77 13.77 21 16 235
47. Brazil 1.26 16.00 18 07 250
48. Chile 1.00 22.36 12 10 120
49. Colombia 1.27 20.66 14 10 380
50. Costa Rica 1.50 25.54 12 09 197
51. Dom. Rep.2 1.47 15.01 12 05 141
52. Guatemala 2.47 19.26 18 09 280
53. Honduras 1.95 29.88 08 14 375
7Country N-growth (n) Capital Flag
 
No.
Constitutions
No. Articles
in
Constitution
54. Mexico 1.12 21.81 16 07 136
55. Nicaragua 1.31 29.36 16 14 202
56. Paraguay 1.80 21.33 32 06 291
57. Peru 1.15 18.59 09 12 206
58. Uruguay 0.29 13.14 10 07 332
59. HongKong 1.00 20.57 09 00 00
Average 1.07 21.93 12.98 4.66 159.4
83H and X are not central to the estimations, except in recovering and weights.a 1− a
Simplifying and taking the natural logarithms of (8) leads to
 Eq. (9) can be estimated by
the OLS method.
2.2 Data
Table 1 presents the data associated with the key variables described next below.
Dependent variable (HDI)
I focus on a small sample of 59 countries dominated by N. America and Asia, for which
data is available. Available data is for 2005 but published in 2007, and all is nearly
readily available. The dependent variable y = ln(exp(HDI)) is available from different
places, including the UNDP’s World Human Development Reports (various), the CIA’s
World Factbook (various), and Wikipedia (2008). Population (N) in millions comes from
the same sources as above .
 Independent variables
Capital (K, k).  This is the the percentage of GDP that goes into fixed capital formation
as given by the IMF’s IFS Yearbook (2007).
Growth rate of L = growth rate of N (*). This is the growth rate of the population with
data drawn from Wikipedia (2008).
Human capital (H). Human capital has two dimensions: Literacy rate and life
expectancy at birth. See References for sources.
GDP (PPP) (X). Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity comes from a variety of
sources including IMF/IFS, CIA (various), and WDRs.3
Flags (F). The key variables here are the dummies for the flag (existence problem) and
dominant flag colors (stability problem, if any). For this I assume that every country’s
national flag has at least one primary color (red, blue, and yellow) in it. Arbitrarily I let
White indicate the existence of a flag. Other flag colors are then set upon a White 
(9)
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background in every country’s flag. I assign an arbitrary value of five for the white
color, i.e. White = 5.
A careful scan of national flags indicates as dominant colors Red, Blue, Yellow, Green,
and Black (see, e.g., photius.com, 2008, flagpedia.net, 2008). I arbitrarily set Blue = 4,
Red = 3, Yellow = 2, and Black = 1. The values of other colors are also arbitrary
designations. For example Green = 8, and Purple =  12. And so on.
Consider the following four examples. Afghanistan is a sovereign country with a national
flag. Its dominant flag colors are Black and Green set on White. Therefore, the dummy
variable for the Afghani flag colors = White + Green + Black = 5 + 8 + 1 = 14. China’s
flag is Red and Yellow, on White, so that its dummy value = White + Red + Yellow = 5
+ 3 + 2 = 10. The U.S. flag is Red, White, and Blue, on White. Since White on White is
White, the value is White + Red + Blue = 5 + 3 + 4 = 12. Cameroon’s flag is Green, Red,
and Yellow, set on White. The dummy value in this case = White + Green + Red +
Yellow = 5 + 8 + 3 + 2 = 18. 
3. Results
Table 2 and Figure 1 summarize the results when not purged for the growth of population
which is statistically insignificant throughout the estimations. I draw attention to Model 2
in both Tables 2 and 3: since every country has a flag, I suppressed the constant term to
avoid the dummy variable trap. Hence, the variable “Flagexistence” is really a common
placeholder for the constant term. Beyond that caution, it is clear that national well-being
increases by no less than eight percent for every percentage increase in capital
investment. National well-being is also highly elastic with respect to the existence of a
national flag. The result seems to suggest that the average nation “feels” significantly
better off when it is autonomous, i.e., when it has its own flag. 
While well-being responds positively to the existence of a flag, it is highly inelastic with
respect to national flag colors as Figure 2 shows. The relationship between national well-
being and the number of constitutions is portrayed in Figure 3, while Figure 4 shows the
correlation between well-being and the number of original articles in constitutions. It is
clear from these that national well-being is  irresponsive to the number of constitutions
and the number of original articles of constitutions. The existence of a constitution alone
and/or the quantity of its articles do not matter for national well-being. The optimal
number of constitutional changes appears to be less than antilog(2) corresponding to an
HDI of 0.80 and above. The majority of countries are around antilog(3), with the
Dominican Republic in a class of its own. This suggests that the quality, rather than
quantity, of constitutions is a better indicator of well-being. Quite obviously a large
number of constitutions indicates instability of the legal system and its rules. Too many
articles means the system is too prescriptive, perhaps even intrusive. Remember from
North (1990), changing constitutions would mean changing institutions and institutional
bases. The consequences are varied, one of which is that people may be afraid to take risk
if constitutional change is frequent. See Figure 3.
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Too large constitutions, that is many articles, also constrain national well-being. It seems
that smaller constitutions are more efficient than large constitutions in the sense that they
are associated with high HDI. The pattern in Figure 4 is less defined than it is in previous
figures, but there is some indication national well-being breaks down into two halves.
The first half is made up of countries with small constitutions and 0.80 < HDI < 1. The
second half consists of nations with large constitutions and 0.55 < HDI < 0.80. 
The results make good commonsense. Large constitutions may be too demanding for
ordinary people to understand. This is Hayek’s interpretation of the negative effect of the
rule of law on constitutional liberty (Hayek, 1978; cf Hamowy, 1978). For example, the
Dominican Republic has had 32 different constitutions, that means a different
constitution every year for 32 years. For most developing countries, where life
expectancy is low, 32 years of different constitutions is a life-time of uncertainty, which
constrains plans, and hence national well-being.
4. Concluding summary
The general importance of national symbols has been a subject of great interest to
political theorists for a long time. While economic ideas about national symbols have
been around for many years as well, quantitative assessments of the effects of national
symbols on national well-being are recent. A large and burgeoning body of literature
using contingent valuation, for example, estimates consumer and producer surpluses of
cultural goods and services like national parks. Constitutions have also entered that
discussion. There are however no quantitative studies of the impact of national flags on
national well-being. This paper fills a tiny crevice in the existing gap.
The paper takes HDI as a measure of national well-being of 59 countries around the
globe. It relates well-being to capital investment, growth of labor, flags, and
constitutions. On the upside, the results show that investment in things contribute
positively to national well-being. The existence of a national flag also strongly affects
national well-being across this group of countries. What this all means is that, despite its
limitations, per capita real GDP remains an important influence on national well-being,
investment would do no harm, and the importance of national symbols like flags cannot
be overstated. 
It is commonsensical that national well-being is inversely related to the population
growth rate. Population growth management is still a reasonable policy since it has
implications for all 8 MDGs. More important than that is that national well-being is
inelastic with respect to national flag colors. The meaning of the flag goes deeper than its
colors. 
Furthermore, changing constitutions reduces national well-being. It suggests that the
legal systems and its rules are unstable, which affects institutions. Large constitutions do
not overcome that handicap. In fact, countries with large constitutions, measured by the
17
number of original articles, tend to do poorer on the HDI indicator of well-being than
countries with small constitutions. 
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